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In his 'Wittgenstein and Aesthetics' (Literature and Aesthetics, Spring 1993),
Lloyd Reinhardt raises the question of scientism: in its strongest form, the
doctrine or ideology that only science can enable us to understand anything,
and in its weakcr forms the vicw that scicntific explanation should act as a
model for other types of explanation. As he points out, onc helpful way of
focusing on what is at stake here is to attend to the contrast between explaining
things by providing causes of their occurrence (where this is taken to be
distinctive ofscientific explanation) and explaining them by providing reasons
for thcm. And further enlightcnment can be gained by examining those
disciplines whcrc there is some uncertainty as to whether one should be
explaining in terms of reasons or causes: do we explain the Indians' rain-dance
in terms of the social cohesion that this otherwise useless exercise secures
(causal explanation) or in terms of the clear intention on the part of the
participants to induce it to rain (reasons)? Wiugcnstcin drcw attention to the
problematic cases of anthropology (in his discussion of Frazer) and psychoa-
nalysis, but such disputes have parallels in a number of arcas in the arts and
humanities. from socialthcory (e.g. in thedisputcsofthe 1960sand 1970s0vcr
whether Marxism was ascientific or humanistic discipline) to musicology (e.g.
in the recent disputes over analysis versus contextualized accounts).
Now one can try to denate such issues by maintaining that the provision of
reasons and the provision ofcauses are designed to achieve different things. so
there isn't really any competition between them: indeed they could, perhaps,
complement one another in any account that had any claim to completeness.
But matters are not quite so simple. For one thing, the advocate of causes will
insist that causes provide us with somcthing fixed and permanent which holds
independently, whercas reasons tend to be context-specific and vary from case
to case. And it may also be maintained that once we have the causal explanation
we have the basic account of why somcthing occurred, so that everything clse
is an added extra. On this view, while reasons may occasionally supplemcnt
causal accounts, thcy can ncver supplant them.
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This brings us to the issue of scientism, where what is ultimately at stake
is the value of the arts and humanities in comparison to the value of the
sciences. Those who pursue the arts and the sciences find them intellectually
satisfying, but are those who pursue the arts satisfied with less, with a less
profound form of understanding perhaps? Or to put the issues in harsher terms,
if our aim is understanding and intellectual satisfaction, could we, if pressed,
do without the arts but not the sciences? I take it such a view is implausible,
but the degree of iL<; implausibility is not matched by the ea<;e with which the
misunderstanding on which it rests can be identified.
One thing we cannot do is risk a converse implausibility, by effectively
identifying scientism with science, so that we end up taking sides for the
humanities and against science, something Wiugenstein comes close to. We
must avoid a 'ranking' of arts and sciences along a spectrum of profundity.
(Indeed, I have general doubts about the value of trying to place different
disciplines on a spectrum and am not at all convinced that the value and
distinctiveness of aesthetic judgement can be captured by placing it on a
spectrum between ethics and mere preference, as Lloyd Reinhardt maintains,
but I don't want to pursue this particular form of scientism-mcasurement
fetish ism-here.) But to question such rank ing does not resolve the maller, nor
does the solution lie simply in pointing out that the arts and the sciences have
different intrinsic merits, for this is precisely what has to be established. The
problem is, then, what kind of thing does one do to establish this? If we have
sympathy with Wiugenstein 's intuitions aboutscientism, can we indicate what
at least some of the sources of the problem might be?
One source that I want to draw attention to, in a very speculative way, is a
misunderstanding about science. One thing that is commonly thought to mark
out science from the arts is that the former exhibits progress, whereas the latter
do not. Yet no one who has made some effort to study thedevcIopment of music
in the century between Beethoven and Schoenberg, say, could deny that all
kinds of progress have been made in the areas of orchestration, phrasing, the
ability to construct continuous large-scale works, and above all in the ability
to expand and explore an emOlionalterrain in music by the chromatization of
harmony and the attempts to shape this chromatization. It is simply a question
of musical fact that Wagner had the compositional techniques to do things in
music that Beethoven could never have done, and that Schoenberg had the
compositional techniques to do things in music that Wagner could never have
done. Of course, this doesn't make Wagner's contribution to music greater
than that of Beethoven, any more than Maxwell's having the techniques to
explain the connection between electricity and magnetism makes his contribu-
tion greater than that of Newton, who lacked these techniques. After all,
Wagner's contribution would have been impossible without Beethoven's, and
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Maxwell's without Newton's. It seems we have progress in both cases,
pro!,'Tess in which later conlributions rely crucially on earlier ones.
This will be disputed if one thinks that only the laller case is one of real
progress, but what is the basis for drawing the distinction? As often as not it is
that sciencc is aiming for the lruth about the naturc of things, a truth which it
approaches as it devclops, whcreas the arts approach nothing like this: thcy
don't progress to anything. And an advocatc of this vicw might add that this
cxplains why, while one can think Newton a greater scicntist than Maxwell,
one cannot prefer Newton 'saccountofmagnetism to that of Maxwell: whereas
ifone thinks that Beethoven isagreatercomposerLhan Wagner,one will prefer
Beethoven's music to that of Wagner. The crux of this argument is that
progress in the slrict sense requires some end, some terminus ad quem,towards
which the progress is directed and against which it can uhimately be judged:
and only science can make such progress in the strict sense. This is uhimately
the point we have to come to terms with if we are to respond effectively to
scientism, for this is something from which scientism derives a good deal of
il<; appeal.
One response we should avoid is to maintain that the arts actually do
progress in this 'strict' sense. The idea of progress in the arts is an Enlighten-
ment conceit, deriving from the idea that art, like everything else, can serve the
common cause of progress. But while we are on the topic of Enlightenment
conceits, we had beller pause to consider Enlightenment conceits about
science. After all, it was the Enlightenment that unveiled the conspimcy of
priests and overthrew religion, claiming in the process the right, previously
reserved by religion, for science to be the arbiter on mallers of the ultimate
nature of things. This had a gradual but remarkable impact, and I draw the
reader's allention to just one: the virtually complete abandonment of 'nature'
as a proper subjcct for aesthetic theory from around 1800, so that from then on
aestheticsdevOlcd itself to works of 'art' and simply fell silent on the questions
of the beauty of nature. Like it or not, 'naturc' was now the exclusive preserve
of the sciences.
What) want to suggest is that the idea that science has asingleend-'lruth'
orthe understanding of 'how things are '-isas muchan Enlightenmentconceit
as the idea of progress in art. The Enlightenment drove out teleology from
nature, only to reinstate it in our search for understanding. Science and the arts
both set up projects which enable us to answer specific questions or achieve
specific things-why planets orbit in ellipses, whether the equations of the
parabola and the ellipse are of the same degree, how to paint a picture so that
its perspectival arrangement can be appreciated from any viewing angle, how
to makc the sonata form seam less so that the sense of a single musical argument
can be conveyed, and so on. Ofcourse there arc substantial differences between
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these projects and the means by which they are achieved, and amongst the
criteria we usc to assess whether they mark an advance beyond earlier
approaches. This is not to suggest that the criteria of success are always purely
internal, if by this we mean that only those inside the discipline are ever in a
position lO assess the viability of the way they are going about dealing with a
problem, but few would doubt that internal criteria are what do the real work.
To impose some overriding criterion-the idea that science converges on the
truth-adds nothing to our understanding of what is going on. This is not to
suggest that pre-Enlightenment philosophers and scientists never raised the
question of knowledge in telcologicalterms, for they manifestly did. What they
did not do, so far as I can tell, is to judge that it could simply be left to science
to deliver the goods, that science was the ultimate arbiter. What earlier
scientists did can of course be glossed as 'the search for truth', but what they
were concerned with was finding (true----of course!) answers lO specific
problems.
The historian of science Alexandre Koyre pointed out in the 1950s that the
successful study of motion began when Galilco and others slOpped conceiving
of the motion of a body in terms of a terminus ad quem (an end point or goal
to which it was directed) and started to consider its motion in terms of its
terminus a quo (its initial state). I suggest that similar benefits are lO be reaped
from thinking of scientific development in terms of the particular projects that
various scientific disciplines take on, rather than in terms of some convergence
on the truth. And if we strip science of this Enlightenment teleological gloss,
we will be able to appreciate the errors of scientism without falling into the
temptation to become anti-science.
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